Our Thoughts

Jakarta (ANTARA) – Defence and security analyst from PT Semar Sentinel Indonesia, Alban Sciascia Ph.D., shared his insights on the evolving global strategic landscape and its implications for Indonesia’s procurement and the maintenance, repair, and overhaul (MRO) of its existing national weapons systems.  

He began by discussing the escalating tensions surrounding the Russia-Ukraine conflict in Crimea near the Black Sea over recent months and its relevance to the procurement and MRO of the Indonesian National Armed Forces’ (TNI) weapon systems.  

M. Sciascia stated on Tuesday that despite a statement from the Spokesperson for the Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Teuku Faizasyah, affirming that the government continues to monitor developments in the Russia-Ukraine conflict, Jakarta has shown little response to the rising tensions between the two nations or the threat of a Russian invasion.  

While Moscow has deployed approximately 100,000 troops, M. Sciascia noted that diplomatic efforts have yet to yield significant results. In response, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) has emphasised the potential to impose a range of sanctions against Russia, including economic and political restrictions.  

“Although the Russia-Ukraine crisis is geographically distant from Indonesia, there are critical lessons to be learned. The potential for conflict could directly impact Indonesia, particularly Jakarta’s defence procurement strategy within the framework of the TNI modernisation plan,” M. Sciascia explained.  

Jakarta, he noted, may need to reassess the proposals from two key defence equipment suppliers. The first is Russia.  

The potential imposition of sanctions under the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) has already prevented Indonesia from acquiring Sukhoi Su-35 fighter jets. As an alternative, Jakarta has considered sourcing weapons and spare parts for its existing Russian-made Sukhoi Su-27/30 Flanker fleet from Belarus and Kazakhstan.  

However, with increasing Western sanctions against Belarus, it is reasonable to anticipate further restrictions due to the ongoing tensions.  

M. Sciascia argued that this situation could ultimately hinder Jakarta’s ambitions to procure defence equipment made by Russia and its allies, potentially leading to what he described as the “premature retirement” of Indonesia’s Sukhoi fighter jets.  

To note, Indonesia initially purchased 16 Sukhoi Su-27/30 Flanker aircraft, which were assigned to Air Squadron 11 at Hasanuddin Air Force Base. The first batch was delivered under President Megawati Soekarnoputri’s administration, arriving with only light weapons and without missile systems.  

Over time, some of the Su-27/30 fleet was reassigned to Air Squadron 14, following the retirement of the Indonesian Air Force’s (TNI AU) F-5E/F Tiger II fighter jets.  

Although CAATSA sanctions are applied selectively on a case-by-case basis, M. Sciascia explained that Russia’s increasingly assertive actions could prompt Washington to expand the scope of its sanctions to achieve greater strategic impact.  

Notably, the crisis on the Russia-Ukraine border may offer insights into the strategic behaviour of NATO member states, with potential repercussions for Indonesia’s defence procurement decisions.  

Germany’s position, in particular, could influence Jakarta’s prioritisation of weapons system acquisitions.  

Germany’s recent decision to block arms exports to Ukraine, as well as its reluctance to grant flight permits for other NATO countries to transport weapons to Ukraine, underscores Berlin’s emphasis on maintaining its economic ties with Moscow.  

This strategic stance has drawn criticism from Western allies.  

“In the past, Germany has refused export licences for domestically produced equipment to safeguard its economic relations with key partners. While Indonesia’s procurement of Russian defence equipment is not as critical as its dealings with Germany, caution is necessary. The dynamics we are witnessing between Berlin and Moscow today could, in the future, emerge between Germany and China,” M. Sciascia stated.  

In fact, trade and economic transactions between Germany and China have grown significantly, making China Germany’s largest trading partner under Chancellor Angela Merkel’s administration. In 2021 alone, Germany ranked as the fourth-largest importer of Chinese goods and the fifth-largest exporter to China, surpassing other European countries.  

German exports to China reached US$109 billion in 2020, while imports from China to Germany amounted to US$86 billion during the same period.  

Even if Germany’s new government introduces some policy shifts, the current situation regarding Ukraine suggests that Berlin may continue to adopt a cautious, non-confrontational stance.  

In addition, despite its recent criticisms towards Beijing, the German government has demonstrated a consistent ability to maintain amicable relations with key global powers, as evident in its diplomatic engagements with Russia and other nations in recent years.  

It is also worth noting that Germany still adheres to the Genscher Doctrine—named after the country’s former Deputy Chancellor and Minister of Foreign Affairs, Hans-Dietrich Genscher—which emphasises diplomatic balance to achieve a “middle ground” in international conflicts.  

Observers have even described this doctrine as a form of quasi-neutralism, which may help explain Germany’s restrained response to the current crisis on Ukraine’s borders.  

Ultimately, if Indonesia’s current Minister of Defence, Prabowo Subianto, is committed to his promise of focusing on long-term defence procurement planning, the government must take evolving geopolitical developments into account. Jakarta must reconsider its procurement sources and seek viable alternatives at the earliest opportunity.  

While the future remains uncertain, Indonesia must anticipate potential geopolitical shifts to avoid the challenges faced by other nations. If Germany becomes as dependent on China as it currently is on Russia, Indonesia must be prepared with strategic contingency measures.  

Reporter: Ade P Marboen
Editor: Tasrief Tarmizi 

ANTARA